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Abstract 
Determining the research and development (R&D) boundaries of the firm as the choice 
between internal, collaborative and external technology acquisition has since long been a 
major challenge for firms to secure a continuous stream of innovative products or processes. 
While research on R&D cooperation or strategic alliances is abundant, little is known about 
the outsourcing of R&D activities to contract research organizations and its implications for 
innovation performance. This paper investigates the driving forces of external technology 
sourcing through contract research based on arguments from transaction cost theory and the 
resource-based view of the firm. Using a large and comprehensive data set of innovating firms 
from Germany our findings suggest that technological uncertainty, contractual experience and 
openness to external knowledge sources motivate the choice for engaging in contract research 
activities. Moreover, we show that internal and external R&D sourcing are complements: the 
marginal contribution of internal (external) R&D is the larger the more firms spend on 
external (internal) R&D. 
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1 Introduction 
Determining the boundaries of the firm has since long been a major topic of research from 
economic (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Klein et al., 1978) or organizational 
perspectives (e.g., Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Thompson, 1967; Galbraith, 1977). In this 
respect, particularly the research and development (R&D) boundaries of the firm have 
attracted attention (Pisano, 1990): to secure a continuous stream of innovative products or 
processes, internal research and development (R&D) activities are often not the only way to 
success. As the institutional loci of new technology can be diverse there is a high probability 
that at least from time to time firms need to source technology externally (Teece, 1986, 1992). 
In fact, a substantial body of literature deals with external technology sourcing through 
cooperative R&D arrangements or strategic alliances (see Hagedoorn, 2002, for an overview). 
Most of the research has focused on aspects related to knowledge spillovers, access to 
complementary knowledge, co-development or cost- and risk-sharing in innovation projects 
(e.g. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Generally speaking, these seem to pay off: Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1997) find for example that strategic alliances used to access external knowledge 
lead to higher success in new product introduction activities. 
While there are many benefits associated with collaborative R&D activities, they also may 
incur significant costs for the partners involved as they engage in joint research projects. 
Transaction cost theory provides the argument that an efficient governance of R&D activities 
will be achieved through markets unless this raises transaction costs that are higher than the 
costs of organizational arrangements (Brockhoff, 1992). R&D cooperation and strategic 
alliances obviously lead to transaction and organization costs as they comprise both a 
contractual relationship as well as organizational interfaces. Such arrangements can, in other 
words, be characterized as “hybrid” forms of organization which emerge as a way to 
economize on transaction costs when “parties to the transaction maintain autonomy but are 
bilaterally dependent to a nontrivial degree” (Williamson, 1991: 271). In their effort to 
optimize the innovation process, however, firms also need to find organizational arrangements 
for those tasks which encompass virtually no interaction with partners and hence do not cause 
organization costs. Moreover, there are tasks that can be characterized as an “ad-hoc problem 
solving” (Winter, 2003), i.e. they require a timely reaction on a closely contoured research 
project. Apart from that, a firm might wish to hold the sole right to exploit the research 
outcome and appropriate the returns once the project is finished (Teece, 1986). This case 
would argue for engaging in external technology sourcing through contract research and 
simply buying the solution on the market for research services. Contract research hence 
represents the opposite pole to internal R&D on the continuum from markets via hybrid to 
hierarchy. It can be defined as the contractually agreed, non-gratuitous and temporary 
performance of R&D tasks for a client by a legally and economically independent contractor, 
whereas the research outcomes will be transferred to the client with all specific exploitation 
rights upon completion of the task (Teece, 1988). 
With a few exceptions, surprisingly little research has been devoted to the study of 
contractual research arrangements since the early 1990s (see Rüdiger, 2000, for an overview). 
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Other ways to source technology externally like R&D collaborations, strategic alliances or 
firm acquisitions have covered most research agendas. With technologies becoming ever 
more complex, especially in the high- and medium-technology industries, these governance 
modes actually seem to be much more suitable to achieve innovation success anyway. 
Contract research, though, still accounts for a substantial share of total innovation expenditure 
in a large number of firms (Eurostat, 2004). While alliance formation and firm acquisitions 
have been studied in detail (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Cassiman et al., 2005), 
comprehensive empirical evidence on what factors lead to engage in contract research is 
scarce. Moreover, several authors refer to transaction cost theory to elucidate specific 
transaction-level characteristics that influence the choice for alternative forms of governance 
(Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Love and Roper, 2002; Gooroochurn and Hanley, 2007). 
Existing literature, however, provides almost no indication for the role of firm-level 
differences in the choice for technology sourcing modes. This is particularly surprising given 
the common belief that firms largely differ in their resource endowment and capabilities (e.g., 
Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991) which should eventually influence R&D boundary decisions 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Moreover, Rothaermel et al. (2006) 
have pointed to complementarities between internal and collaborative R&D which also argues 
for a more detailed exploration of such effects between internal R&D and contract research. 
Even less is known about the performance implications, i.e. how contract research translates 
into innovation success. Contract research being used only for simple (and low-interest) 
projects would suggest that innovation expenditure is better spent elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
efficiently handling ad-hoc problems and economizing on organization costs might prove to 
be central for innovation success. 
This paper addresses the above mentioned shortcomings of existing literature in two ways: 
first, it provides a conceptual model explaining the R&D governance mode from a transaction 
and firm-level perspective. Second, the governance choice with a particular focus on 
complementarities between the different modes is related to innovation success. Our 
econometric tests are based on a comprehensive data set of around 1,400 German firms 
engaged in contract research.  
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview on the 
motivation to externally contract research activities while Section 3 presents our conceptual 
considerations and the subsequent hypotheses. Section 4 highlights our empirical study to test 
the latter. Empirical results are presented in Section 5. We discuss our findings in section 6. 
Section 7 closes with concluding remarks. 
2 Motives for engaging in contract research 
Technological change as well as the geographic and organizational dispersion of expertise 
have led to a wide variety of organizational arrangements for the generation and acquisition of 
knowledge. Traditionally, outsourcing, i.e. the external provision of certain services, had been 
largely used for rather specialized or repetitive tasks like logistics or facility management. But 
over time also other value chain activities closely related to the core of the firm – like 
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production – have become subject to outsourcing decisions (Leiblein et al., 2002; Leiblein and 
Miller, 2003), for example in the automotive industry where a whole model series of cars 
could be assembled by contract manufacturers. Contract research as the outsourcing of R&D 
activities basically follows the same logic in that it is directed at exploiting certain advantages 
associated with the nature and purpose of contract research organizations, whether they may 
be private firms or universities and research centers. The idea of contracting research to 
external firms or research institutes is not new. In fact, the consulting firm Arthur D. Little 
roots back to the year 1886 with the offering of “investigations for the improvement of 
processes and the perfection of products” (Kahn, 1986). Several potential benefits for firms 
engaging in contract research can be identified. However, it has to be recognized that these 
benefits also apply to a large extent to hybrid forms of organization, i.e. R&D collaborations 
or alliances. 
A first group of advantages centers around a reduction of costs compared with the same 
R&D activities performed in-house. Cost advantages may be achieved by a specialization of 
the contract research organization or by a cost sharing in a joint commissioning of more than 
one client. Moreover, fixed costs could be reduced and R&D time and budget better 
controlled (Tapon and Thong, 1999). Besides cost aspects, quality advantages through 
contract research may be possible as the contract research organizations can employ 
specialized know-how, equipment and infrastructure. Using external sources should also 
foster creativity within internal R&D as new research methods and perspectives are brought 
in. Another advantage relates to timing issues and undivided attention that the project may 
receive. This could especially be important if the firm tries catching up with competitors in an 
area of technology where no or little competence is available internally (Tapon and Cadsby, 
1994). Apart from this, firms might choose to deliberately install competition to stimulate 
internal R&D. Such form of competition could also prove to be helpful in overcoming internal 
resistance to innovation projects. Finally, firms could get access to public R&D funding more 
easily when they involve public contract research organizations like universities or research 
institutes (David and Hall, 2000) or when the R&D activities are carried out in particular 
regions (Tapon and Cadsby, 1994). 
A substantial body of literature has dealt with contractual research arrangements from the 
perspective of universities and other public research institutes which have become important 
players on the market for research services in recent years (Bozeman, 2000; Link and Siegel, 
2007). Universities or research institutes have a particular reputation as providing access to 
leading-edge technological knowledge resulting from projects that are more oriented towards 
basic research (Dosi et al., 2006). In the U.S., it was also the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act 
in 1980 that spurred a rapid rise of commercial knowledge transfers from academia to 
industry (Stevens, 2004). On the one hand, existing research has focused on formal university 
technology transfer mechanisms, i.e. those that embody or directly lead to a legal 
instrumentality like a patent, license or royalty agreement (Bozeman, 2000; Siegel and Phan, 
2005). On the other hand, informal university technology transfer mechanisms have attracted 
attention as they comprise informal communication processes, such as technical assistance, 
consulting or collaborative research (Link et al., 2006). Most of the research focuses on the 
role of technology licensing in industry-science linkages (e.g., Feldman et al., 2002; Thursby 
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and Thursby, 2002). Licensing shows important similarities with contract research in that it 
serves as a mechanism for external technology acquisition without a joint research effort. 
Hence, licensing can be considered as a viable alternative to contract research with 
universities and research institutes to access innovative knowledge.1 As a matter of fact, 
however, the contracting firm might experience difficulties in the appropriation of the returns 
of the licensed technology as the licensor is still the ultimate owner of the technology. 
While contract research appears to have several advantages, there are also several problems 
associated with the external provision of R&D services: intellectual property rights as a result 
of such activities might be difficult to appropriate. Moreover, the contractual relationship 
involves information asymmetries in that potential contractors might – other than promised –
lack the required expertise compared with a firm’s own R&D department (Love and Roper, 
2002). Contracting firms may also have considerable steering, control and confidentiality 
problems of the contracted research. They lose the opportunity to learn which leads to a 
situation where firms may critically depend on the contract research organization. Besides 
that, contract research might trigger a “not invented here” syndrome which would lead to a 
reluctance of in-house R&D to adopt external technology (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). 
Outsourcing those R&D projects that appear to be of high strategic relevance hence 
constitutes a risky strategy. Using a transaction cost framework, Teece (1988) consequently 
explains the reluctance of firms to rely heavily on external procurement of technological 
knowledge with contractual uncertainty, cumulative knowledge acquisition and a limited 
transferability of research outcomes. Similar arguments have been provided by Pisano (1990) 
and Brockhoff (1992). Contract research is hence supposed to be only a viable alternative to 
other governance modes for certain types of R&D activities, i.e. for rather simple and less 
strategically relevant research tasks.  
According to the above mentioned arguments for and against contract research, transaction 
cost theory would suggest that markets are more efficient than hierarchies unless the costs of 
transacting with contract research organizations turn the relationship less favorable. 
Moreover, differences in a firm’s R&D capabilities might influence the boundary decision to 
create valuable firm-specific knowledge. The following section will hence adopt a transaction 
and firm-level perspective to determine factors that lead firms to actually engage in contract 
research or not. Afterwards, the analysis focuses on the question how contract research 
translates into innovation success. 
3 Conceptual framework 
This section derives our set of empirically testable hypotheses adopting a transaction and 
firm-level perspective for the choice of governance modes. We then proceed with the 
hypotheses linking these modes with innovation success. 
                                                 
1 It goes without saying that licensed-in technology may also originate from private firms. 
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3.1 Transaction cost theory and innovation activities 
A large body of literature has successfully employed transaction cost economics to describe 
how the conditions of contractual relationships affect the optimal form of organization (e.g., 
Robbertson and Gatignon, 1998; Leiblein et al., 2002; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Transaction 
cost theory suggests that it is the cost associated with the governance of such relations which 
is central to determining the choice for a particular form of coordination of a transaction 
(Klein et al., 1978; Williamson, 1979). Hence, a firm will select the form of coordination that 
is associated with the lowest level of cost. Regarding the sourcing of technology, the choice is 
typically between “market”, resulting in transaction costs, and “hierarchy”, resulting in 
organization costs. In other words, firms can choose between buying a technology at the 
market for research services and performing the required R&D activities in-house. The 
resulting trade-offs between internalizing and outsourcing firm activities have been analyzed 
in various settings (e.g., Walker and Weber, 1984; Leiblein et al., 2002). Besides these two 
poles, “hybrid” forms of governance like cooperative R&D arrangements or R&D alliances 
have been widely used by firms and studied by researchers (e.g., Pisano, 1990; Brockhoff, 
1992; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Aschhoff and Schmidt, 2006). However, the setup of 
organizational interfaces in R&D cooperation incurs organization costs that need to be 
balanced with an entirely external provision of R&D services through contract research which 
would lead to transaction costs exclusively. 
Due to the benefits of specialization in the marketplace, applications of transaction cost 
theory generally assume that markets represent a more efficient governance mode than 
hierarchy (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). There are situations, however, in which the costs of 
market exchange may surpass the technical efficiencies of the market. More specifically, 
contract research incurs costs to negotiate and write the contract as well as costs to monitor 
and enforce the contractual performance (Williamson, 1975). Transaction cost theory hence 
focuses on the identification of exchange characteristics that would best be reflected in a 
market, hybrid or hierarchical organization. Adopting a rather abstract level of explanation, 
the two main factors driving the analysis have been identified as uncertainty and asset 
specifity (Williamson, 1985): transaction costs seem to increase with increasing uncertainty, 
and the necessity to rely on transaction-specific assets (Williamson, 1979; Englander, 1988). 
In combination with a certain behavior, which is characterized by bounded rationality and 
opportunism, these attributes or dimensions will hence largely determine the transaction costs 
associated with contractual research arrangements (Brockhoff, 1992). 
Uncertainty 
Uncertainty can be described as the degree to which unforeseen environmental change 
influences and alters the conditions underlying the contractual arrangement (Leiblein and 
Miller, 2003). Uncertainty raises transaction costs through a number of channels. First, a 
higher number of expected contingencies will presumably raise the effort to set up and 
enforce a contract. Moreover, uncertainty decreases the ability to assess the contribution of 
any individual activity which in turn increases the risk of shirking (Demsetz, 1988). Factors 
that may lead to a higher perceived uncertainty during the transaction include rapid changes in 
the technologies employed, a short product life cycle or a high threat from a substitutability of 
6 
the own product by competitor products. Moreover, firms may have experienced failures in 
their innovation activities that could be related to the market or technology environment. 
Uncertainty can be met by hierarchical organization in that this form of governance facilitates 
an improved measurement, monitoring and control of the activities performed. Hence, the 
higher the perceived uncertainty the higher the transaction costs turn out to be and the less 
likely the choice of contract research instead of hierarchical organization becomes. Our first 
hypothesis hence is: 
Hypothesis 1: Uncertainty related to the innovation activities increases transaction costs and 
thereby reduces the propensity to engage in contract research. 
Specifity of assets 
The second driving factor of transaction costs is the specifity of assets employed in the 
contractual relationship. It defines the degree to which the assets in a contractual research 
arrangement are more valuable in their current application than in their second best use 
(Leiblein and Miller, 2003). High levels of specific assets create opportunities for an 
appropriation or “hold-up” of quasi-rents by opportunistic contracting firms and contract 
research organizations. The suppliers of research services may be subject to a hold-up 
situation when the contract research requires buyer-specific investments resulting in few 
alternatives for the supplier (Williamson, 1985). This will in turn motivate a more complex 
negotiation and a higher level of contractual safeguards. Moreover, by deterring investments 
in other efficiency-improving assets fewer opportunities for the appropriation of quasi-rents 
arise. In this context, Williamson (1989) puts particular emphasis on “physical asset specifity” 
and “human asset specifity”. Asset specifity will therefore presumably be higher when an 
innovation project starts from scratch, i.e. when no predecessor product had successfully been 
introduced to the market before. In this case, costly investments into physical and human 
assets will be required to establish a productive relationship. Again, hierarchical organization 
as an alternative can serve as basis for coping with asset specifity as the often-cited example 
of General Motors’ integration of “Fisher Body”, one of its key suppliers, illustrates (Klein et 
al., 1978). Our second hypothesis hence reads: 
Hypothesis 2: Specifity of assets increases transaction costs and thereby reduces the 
propensity to engage in contract research. 
While providing valuable insights, it has to be recognized that transaction cost economics 
makes quite restrictive assumptions leading to some implications which cannot be justified in 
reality. In this respect, firms facing a given set of transactional attributes would in equilibrium 
reach the same conclusion regarding the governance mode of their R&D activities. Several 
examples, however, show that this proposition does not hold in the real world, for example in 
the fashion industry where some firms rely on a vertically integrated structure while other 
firms confine themselves to design and marketing activities. Instead, a firm’s specific history, 
existing portfolio of transactions as well as other firm-specific assets and capabilities could 
exert a substantial influence on the decision to outsource R&D activities (Leiblein and Miller, 
2003). The optimal form of governance should thus depend on both the attributes of the 
transaction and the pre-existing strengths and weaknesses of the firm. 
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3.2 Firm-level effects and innovation activities 
The resource and capability based view (RBV) of the firm provides an instrument to 
investigate the effect of firm-level capabilities on outsourcing decisions (Leiblein and Miller, 
2003). Capabilities are organizational processes which bundle strategic resources into unique 
combinations and constitute superior performance themselves (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
This follows the basic rationale that competitive advantage does not only arise from the 
possession of strategic resources but also from the way in which they are used (Penrose, 
1959). Two main aspects have been put forward by the RBV. First, firms are heterogeneous 
with respect to their resource and capability endowment. Second, valuable resources and 
capabilities are limited in supply. Their creation is costly and involves causal ambiguities 
(e.g., Barney, 1991). In contrast to transaction cost theory which focuses on the characteristics 
of rather isolated transactions and associated costs, the RBV centers around the search for 
competitive advantage that stems from an exploitation of unique firm attributes and R&D 
governance modes. Consequently, firms will strive to choose the governance mode that 
leverages the value of existing capabilities or that complements capabilities in a way that 
knowledge gaps can be bridged (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). This implies that firms need to be 
open to externally available knowledge resources. For example, Pisano (1990) analyzed an 
established US pharmaceuticals firm that wanted to commercialize a new biotechnology-
related product. It had the choice between developing the required R&D capabilities in-house 
and relying on external R&D procurement by a biotechnology firm which was assumed to be 
more efficient in carrying out the R&D tasks. 
Generally speaking, any firm-specific resource and capability may influence a firm’s 
boundary decision in R&D. However, the RBV argues that particularly those activities will be 
carried out in-house where the firm possesses valuable and difficult-to-imitate capabilities. 
Zollo and Winter (2002) conceive the acquisition of such capabilities as a continuous and 
deliberate learning process. This process describes a firm’s systematic methods for a 
modification of its operating routines. Such routines constitute stable patterns of 
organizational behavior and reaction on internal or external stimuli (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). As a consequence, this process explains why, over time, some firms are more effective 
in implementing specific governance structures than others. The two driving factors of the 
analysis hence center around the concepts of contractual experience as well as openness to 
external knowledge. 
Contractual experience 
At first glance, recurring transactions with contract research organizations have a direct 
influence on transaction costs. Firms need to enter into contracts several times which requires 
negotiating efforts and a constant monitoring of the relationships. Over time, however, firms 
should be able to find efficient contractual arrangements to deal with a large number of 
recurring transactions. In fact, relatively high one-time costs upon establishment of a 
contractual relationship should enable firms to economize on later transactions as possible 
sources of conflict can be foreseen and avoided (Brockhoff, 1992). Moreover, firms may 
differ in their ability to select suitable contract research organizations as well as to negotiate 
and monitor the contract (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Particularly those firms are presumably 
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inclined to engage in outsourcing activities that have developed a refined contracting 
experience (state dependence). In this respect, recurring transactions foster a common 
understanding of routines, cultures, systems, and other firm characteristics (e.g., Gulati and 
Singh, 1998) as they lead to the development of relational capabilities (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). Contracting experience hence supports the development of organizational routines 
directed at an efficient collaboration with a variety of partners (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). It 
has to be noted, however, that not only the number of contract research arrangements may be 
important but also whether or not firms engaged in hybrid forms of organizations like R&D 
collaborations. These should presumably serve as a way to acquire experience which could be 
beneficial for shaping a contract research relationship. Our third hypothesis therefore 
assumes: 
Hypothesis 3: Contractual experience increases the propensity to engage in contract 
research. 
Openness to external knowledge 
The RBV has made clear that unique knowledge resources, be they internal or external, are 
the most valuable assets of a firm for achieving competitive advantage (Liebeskind, 1996). 
Knowledge is crucial for firm success as it provides a platform for decisions on what 
resources and capabilities to deploy, develop or discard as the environment changes (Ndofor 
and Levitas, 2004). In this respect, recent literature has pointed towards the merits of 
acquiring external knowledge (Tsang, 2000) and moving from “research and develop” 
towards “connect and develop” (Huston and Sakkab, 2006). The “open innovation” model by 
Chesbrough (2003) extends this perspective on how firms innovate. Shorter product life 
cycles as well as the growing complexity of technologies and markets motivate firms to use 
external sources of knowledge. Moreover, external sources have become more readily 
available as information and communication technologies have improved. Hence, firms that 
reach out to actors beyond firm boundaries will presumably be in a position to maximise the 
benefits from inventions and ideas (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Contract research in this 
sense extends and enhances the value of a firm’s capabilities. Consequently, the openness 
should be triggered by a lack of qualified personnel or technological information which 
eventually materializes as a heightened demand for external knowledge and other external 
inputs in the innovation process (Fagerberg, 2005; Monjon and Waelbroeck, 2003; Peters, 
2003). In fact, several studies have identified positive performance effects from incorporating 
external knowledge into firm capabilities. Such effects range from innovation success 
(Gemünden et al., 1992; Love and Roper, 2004) to increased novelty of innovations (Landry 
and Amara, 2002) as well as higher returns to R&D investments (Nadiri, 1993). 
Nevertheless, it has to be considered that the openness to external knowledge resources also 
depends on the ability of a firm to recognize their potential value for the innovation process. 
This ability has been summarized as the absorptive capacity of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990). External sources of knowledge need to be identified, activated and managed for 
innovation success (Gottfredson et al., 2005; Stock and Tatikonda, 2004). Absorptive capacity 
basically comprises a set of organizational routines (Zahra and George, 2002). It has three 
major components: the identification of valuable knowledge in the environment, its 
9 
assimilation with existing knowledge stocks and the final exploitation for successful 
innovation. These continuous learning engagements increase awareness for market and 
technology trends, which can be translated into pre-emptive actions. Absorptive capacity 
provides firms with a richer set of diverse knowledge which gives them more options for 
solving problems and reacting to environmental change (Bowman and Hurry, 1993; March, 
1991). As a result, absorptive capacity enables firms to predict future developments more 
accurately (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). It is often developed as a by-product of R&D 
activities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). However, some authors have defined it more broadly 
as a dynamic capability that refocuses a firm’s knowledge base through iterative learning 
processes (Szulanski, 1996; Zahra and George, 2002). In effect, absorptive capacity enables 
firms to find and recognize relevant external knowledge sources so that it can be combined, 
i.e. assimilated, with existing knowledge (Todorova and Durisin, 2007). This should in turn 
be reflected in the increased propensity to engage in contract research. Our fourth hypothesis 
hence reads as follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Openness to external knowledge increases the propensity to engage in contract 
research. 
Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical considerations regarding both the transaction and the 
firm-level factors influencing the decision to engage in contract research activities: an 
increase in uncertainty and asset specifity both increase transaction cost which in turn leads to 
a decrease in the probability of external technology sourcing, i.e. the outsourcing of R&D 
activities. An increase in experience and openness to external innovation stimuli both increase 
state dependence and external capability sourcing which leads to an increase in the probability 
of outsourcing. The outsourcing decision is also influenced by “control” variables like firm 
size or absorptive capacity. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework integrating transaction and firm-level perspectives 
Uncertainty
Experience
Asset specifity
Openness
(+)
(+)
(+)
(+)
Transaction
costs
State dependence
& Capability
sourcing
Outsourcing
decisionControls
(+)
(-)
 
3.3 Governance modes and innovation performance 
There are a number of studies that have investigated the factors influencing the choice 
between market and hierarchy in depth. However, little attention has been paid to 
performance implications of this choice. In fact, several studies examine the success impact of 
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R&D collaboration and alliances (e.g., Belderbos et al., 2004; Rothaermel et al., 2006) or the 
effect of outsourced non-R&D firm activities (e.g., Leiblein et al., 2002; Leiblein and Miller, 
2003) on firm performance, but little is known about the relationship between contract 
research and innovation success, for example in terms of new products introduced to the 
market. This second step of our analysis hence relates the different governance modes with 
innovation performance. While the transaction cost arguments presented above might at least 
implicitly suggest that internal and external R&D are substitutes, it has long been recognized 
that both forms are rather complementary (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). Combining 
internal and external R&D hints at a particular mix of innovation expenditures that will be 
associated with a certain level of innovation success. In this sense, internal and external 
knowledge acquisition opens an extensive scope for complementarities to be realized. 
Although the governance modes thus need to be balanced carefully depending on the 
objectives associated with the activity (Rothaermel et al., 2006), existing literature has 
confined external R&D almost exclusively to collaborative R&D arrangements. In fact, this 
governance mode itself balances transaction and organization costs and has proven to be a 
successful knowledge acquisition strategy. Moreover, contract research being used only for 
rather simple (and low-interest) projects would suggest that collaborative R&D is indeed a 
better channel to spend innovation expenditure (Teece, 1988). 
However, firms also need to find organizational arrangements for those tasks which require 
virtually no interaction with partners and hence do not cause organization costs. In the effort 
to optimize the innovation process, contract research might hence be an efficient way for 
handling ad-hoc problems and saving organization costs. In fact, literature has pointed to the 
importance of timing in innovation activities in the context of first mover and follower 
advantages (see for example Jensen, 2003; Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988; Shankar et al., 
1998). Obviously, the purchase of external R&D services through contract research is often 
easier and faster to establish than R&D collaborations. Thus they can be superior to hybrid 
forms of governance when a timely reaction on a closely contoured research project is 
required. Resulting efficiency gains should consequently lead to better innovation 
performance. It has to be acknowledged, however, that being a good “buyer” also requires to 
be a good “maker” (Radnor, 1991; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). In other words, the 
absorptive capacities of the firm come into play when complementarities between internal and 
external R&D shall be realized.  
From this it follows that the effectiveness of contract research critically depends on the 
firm’s in-house R&D capacity (Chatterji, 1996). Internal knowledge capabilities need to be 
identified to effectively use external know-how (Arora and Gambardella, 1990). Another 
implication is that contract research should typically require higher absorptive capacities than 
R&D collaboration as in the latter case absorptive capacity will be built up by all partners 
involved as they engage in the cooperation. Consequently, we hypothesize that there is a 
complementary effect between in-house R&D and contract research which should prove to be 
particularly beneficial in handling ad-hoc problems and providing a timely reaction to 
research tasks. Both should have a positive impact on innovation performance. As absorptive 
capacity is generally developed as a by-product of internal R&D activities, our fifth 
hypothesis which focuses on innovation performance can be split up into three components: 
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Hypothesis 5a: Internal R&D activities increase innovation performance. 
Hypothesis 5b: External R&D activities increase innovation performance. 
Hypothesis 5c: There exists a complementary relationship between internal and external 
R&D activities. 
4 Research design  
4.1 Model 
To tackle both research questions, i.e. the choice of governance mode and the performance 
implications of that choice, we estimate two different econometric models: first a probit 
model for the governance choice and then a tobit model for innovation success. Our probit 
approach follows other authors who have employed binary choice models to assess the effect 
of a set of covariates on the make-or-buy decision (e.g., Anderson, 1988; Silverman et al., 
1997; Leiblein and Miller, 2003). Our dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a firm is engaged in contract research activities. We relate the probability of a 
firm to outsource R&D activities to the transaction and firm-level variables as well as to 
control variables for observed firm heterogeneity. 
The use of a tobit in the second step of our econometric procedure reflects the choice of our 
dependent variable as a measure for innovation success: it is measured as the share of sales 
with innovative products that qualify as market novelties, relative to total sales. This measure 
for innovation success is heavily left-censored since many firms do not have any market 
novelties and thus also no sales from this type of innovation. Tobit models adequately treat 
this specific feature of our data by treating firms without market novelties differently from 
firms with market novelties. 
A more technical issue is that one of our variables is generated by a factor analysis which 
leads to a “generated regressors problem” (e.g., Wooldridge, 2007, Section 6.2) which in turn 
leads to biased standard errors of the coefficient estimates. We therefore bootstrap our 
standard errors using 100 replications. 
In contrast to OLS models, the coefficient estimates in probit and tobit models do not 
directly translate into marginal effects – e.g., the percentage change in the outcome variable 
due to a one unit change in the explanatory variable – which is why we present our estimation 
results both in terms of coefficient estimates and marginal effects.  
The probability of firm i to outsource R&D, conditional on the vector of explanatory 
variables X and a vector of coefficients that maps the explanatory variables to the choice 
probability, β, is P[R&D outsourcingi=1|Xi,β]=Φ(Xi β), where Φ(.) denotes the cumulated 
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standard normal density function.2 The marginal effect of a change in the k-th element of 
vector Xi, Xik on the probability of outsourcing is  
).(
],|&[ βφββ ik
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X
XgoutsourcinDRP =∂
∂
 
There are three possible marginal effects to be calculated for the tobit model: (i) the 
marginal effect of the k-th explanatory variable on the probability of having no innovation 
success at all, (ii) the effect on innovation success unconditional on having any success and 
(iii) the effect on innovation success conditional on having any innovation success. Our focus 
is on the latter quantity, which we also display in our results tables, since it is the most 
relevant one. The conditional expected value of innovation success, IS, of firm i is  
( ) ( )σγσφσγγσγ //],,|[ iiiii ZZZZISE +Φ= , 
where the terms Zi, γ, σ and ( ).φ  denote the vector of variables explaining innovation 
success, the vector of coefficients mapping the explanatory variables to innovation success, 
the standard error of the error term and the standard normal density function respectively.3  
The marginal effect of a one unit change in one of the explanatory variables conditional on 
having positive new product sales is 
( )σγγσγ /],,|[ ik
ik
ii Z
Z
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∂
. 
The marginal effects discussed above relate to changes in continuous variables. For dummy 
variables we calculate the change in the probability of R&D outsourcing due to a change in 
the dummy variable from 0 to 1 (probit model) and the change in the expected value of 
innovation success due to a change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
It is important to note that the marginal effects in the probit and tobit model, in contrast to 
the estimated coefficients, vary across observations. We therefore evaluate the marginal 
effects at the mean of the explanatory variables. Standard errors corresponding to the 
marginal effects are calculated using the “Delta method” (e.g. Greene, 2003, Section 5.2.4) 
throughout. 
4.2 Data 
We use cross-sectional data from the German part of the fourth European Union’s 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS-4) conducted in 2005 to estimate both econometric 
                                                 
2  Note that we normalize the standard error of the error term of the choice equation to 1 as it is common 
practice in applied econometrics. We assume that this error term is normally distributed which leads to the 
probit model. If we assume logistically distributed error terms instead, we obtain the logit model. 
3  The tobit model has a probit-part (for firms with 0 new product sales) and a linear part (for firms with 
positive new product sales share) which identifies the standard error of the error term. 
13 
models. The survey is conducted annually by the Centre for European Economic Research 
(ZEW) on behalf of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. It is designed as 
a panel survey (Mannheim Innovation Panel, MIP) starting in 1993. The methodology and 
questionnaires used by the survey, which is targeted at enterprises with at least five 
employees, complies with the harmonized survey methodology prepared by Eurostat for CIS 
surveys. The 2005 survey collected data on the innovation activities of enterprises during the 
three-year period 2002-2004. About 5,200 firms in manufacturing and services responded to 
the German survey and provided information on their innovation activities. We use this data 
to measure the concepts presented above. 
CIS surveys are self-reported and largely qualitative which raises quality issues with regards 
to administration, non-response and response accuracy (for a discussion see Criscuolo et al., 
2005). First, our CIS survey was administered via mail which prevents certain shortcomings 
and biases of telephone interviews (for a discussion see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). 
The multinational application of CIS surveys adds extra layers of quality management and 
assurance. CIS surveys are subject to extensive pre-testing and piloting in various countries, 
industries and firms with regards to interpretability, reliability and validity (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006). Second, a comprehensive non-response analysis of the German survey for more 
than 4,200 firms showed no systematic distortions between responding and non-responding 
firms with respect to their innovation activities (Rammer et al., 2005). Third, the 
questionnaire contains detailed definitions and examples to increase response accuracy. 
Longhand questions (e.g. “Please describe your most important product innovation briefly”) 
allow robustness checks for multiple choice answers. In conclusion, the major advantages of 
CIS surveys are that they provide direct, importance-weighted measures. On the downside, 
this information is self-reported. Heads of R&D departments or innovation management are 
asked directly if and how their company was able to generate innovations. This immediate 
information on processes and outputs can complement traditional measures for innovation 
such as patents (Kaiser, 2002; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
We restrict the sample to firms with innovation activities and in particular to those with 
product innovations. Although contract research could also result in process innovations we 
use the share of turnover with market novelties as a dependent variable and success measure 
in the second estimation which in turn requires a restriction on product innovators to yield an 
unbiased effect. In total, we retain 1,398 observations without missing values for the 
technology sourcing decision and 1,437 observations for the product innovation success 
equation. We use the 2005 wave of the MIP although the MIP is a panel data set which thus in 
principle would allow us to control unobserved firm-specific fixed effects. There are two 
reasons why we stick to the 2005 wave only: (i) many variables central to our analysis were 
collected in the 2005 survey only and (ii) the MIP data is highly unbalanced which means that 
many firms only participate infrequently which does not help handling unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, the panel structure is exploited for our concept of contractual 
experience which will be presented in more detail below. 
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4.3 Empirical proxy variables 
Uncertainty 
A variety of measures for uncertainty has been identified in the literature (e.g., Leiblein and 
Miller, 2003). Focusing on uncertainty with respect to the innovation process, we employ two 
measures that reflect the central dimensions of uncertainty in innovation activities: uncertainty 
about the outcome as well as about the technology. Innovation projects inevitably involve the 
risk of project failure as the outcome of any project can be considered as uncertain. In the case 
of failure, investments, and particularly sunk investments, can not be recovered. Hence, we 
measure uncertainty regarding the outcome of the innovation process by a dummy variable 
that is coded 1 (and 0 otherwise) if the firm conducted an innovation project in the past three 
years that turned out to be a failure. As project failures should trigger learning processes, we 
argue that firms which encountered an innovation failure within the past three years are likely 
to better foresee the outcome of the current innovation process, which in turn should decrease 
perceived uncertainty – they will presumably not repeat the same mistakes they made in the 
failed innovation project. Our first proxy variable should hence have a positive impact on the 
propensity to engage in contract research. 
The impact of an uncertain technology environment on the innovation process has been 
widely acknowledged (e.g., Miller and Friesen, 1983; Jansen et al., 2006). Uncertainty about 
the technology employed in an innovation project may be high when technological change is 
rapid, or when products and services together with their underlying technologies become 
obsolete fast. Our second proxy variable for uncertainty is hence generated by a factor 
analysis of these two variables measuring whether or not technological change is rapid and 
products and services become obsolete fast. Both variables are measured on a four-point 
Likert scale and the scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) equals 0.736. Our measure 
for the uncertainty of the technology environment can hence be regarded as satisfactory and 
should carry a negative sign in the model estimation. 
Asset specifity 
Various forms of specific assets have been analyzed in the literature, ranging from 
customized physical assets to human capital. Specifity arises when these assets are tailored to 
a specific need (Williamson, 1979). In a contract research relationship this may involve the 
establishment of certain facilities, infrastructure and personnel for both contracting partners. 
Investments into these assets will presumably be higher if no predecessor product exists, i.e. 
when an innovation project starts from scratch. Hence our measure for asset specifity is a 
dummy variable coded as 1 (and 0 otherwise) in case no predecessor product exists among the 
introduced product innovations. The variable should have a negative impact on the propensity 
to engage in contract research activities. 
Contractual experience 
We measure the contractual experience of a firm in two alternative ways. Our most direct 
measure is a dummy variable that is coded 1 if a firm engaged in contract research in the 
years from 1998 to 2003. The data we use is gathered from three waves of the MIP conducted 
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in 2001, 2003 and 2004 and merged with the MIP data from 2005. We denote the 
corresponding variable as “state dependence dummy” since it in fact measures state 
dependence. A drawback of using additional survey years is that the resulting panel of firms is 
highly unbalanced leading to a substantial decrease in the number of observations. Including 
the state dependence dummy variable incurs a drop in sample size by 52 percent.  
In order to avoid such substantial losses in the number of observations – which is directly 
related to a substantial reduction in statistical significance – we estimate a second model 
where we include a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the firm engaged in innovation 
cooperation, i.e. a hybrid governance mode, in the years from 2002 to 2004. The 
questionnaire lists suppliers, customers, competitors, consulting firms, universities or research 
centers as potential partners in innovation cooperation. The resulting variable can also be 
considered as a rather direct measure of interaction with the suppliers of technology. We 
expect both variables to have a positive effect on the propensity to engage in contract 
research. 
Openness to external knowledge 
Our measures of openness to external knowledge refer on the one hand to the perceived lack 
of qualified personnel or technological information and on the other hand to the demand for 
external knowledge and other external inputs in the innovation process. Consequently, we 
measure openness by four variables: (i) the perceived lack of qualified personnel, (ii) the 
perceived lack of technological information, (iii) the breadth of information sources employed 
and (iv) the depth of information sources employed. The first two proxy variables are 
generated from two survey questions regarding factors hampering innovation activities and 
measured on a four-point Likert scale. We argue that firms which state that qualified 
personnel and/or technological information have been obstacles in the innovation process 
perceive a need for knowledge inputs which in turn triggers the openness to external 
knowledge. We thus expect the two variables to have positive effects on the propensity to 
engage in contract research.  
The differentiation between breadth and depth of external innovation impulses has been 
suggested by Laursen and Salter (2006) and provides two direct measures for a firm’s 
openness. We are able to obtain information on a comprehensive list of potential external 
sources for innovation and their importance. These nine options are suppliers, customers, 
competitors, consultancies, universities, public research institutions, conferences, scientific 
journals and trade associations. Following Laursen and Salter (2006), we measure a firm’s 
breadth of external innovation inputs as the number of different sources used (from 0 to 9) 
and depth as the number of sources they assigned a high importance to. We expect these 
variables to have a positive impact on the probability of outsourcing. 
Pattern of innovation expenditure 
The hypotheses on the relationship between the R&D governance modes and innovation 
success assume that both internal and external R&D positively impact innovation success and 
that there are complementarities between both governance modes that result in a positive 
impact on innovation success. Consequently, we measure internal R&D by the share of 
16 
internal R&D expenditures over total innovation expenditures. We use the share instead of the 
level of expenditures in order not to estimate sheer firm size effects. Accordingly, we measure 
external R&D by the share of external R&D expenditures over total innovation expenditures. 
We test for complementarities between internal and external R&D by interacting both 
variables in our specification. Let CR denote the share of innovation expenditure spent for 
contract research, i.e. external R&D, and RD denote the share spent for internal R&D. The 
joint effect of internal and external R&D on innovation success IS, assuming linear 
relationships, is hence given by: 
θλδαγ iii WCRRDCRRDZIS +++==* , 
where Wi denotes the vector of variables other than external R&D, contract research and the 
interaction between them. IS* is the unobserved “latent” innovation success. If IS* ≤ 0, firms 
have no innovation success, for IS* > 0, innovation success is positive and observed in our 
data. 
The effect of internal and external R&D on innovation success are respectively: 
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which implies that the efficacy of internal and external R&D mutually depend on one 
another. The parameter λ measures by how much the effect of internal R&D on innovation 
success changes due to contract research. If λ is positive, contract research and internal R&D 
are complements, if it is negative, they are substitutes: 
λ=∂
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The marginal effect of a one unit change in internal R&D expenditures now no longer varies 
across observations but also depends on external R&D expenditures (and vice versa): 
( ) ( )σγλασγ /],,|[ ii
ik
ii ZCR
RD
ZISE Φ+=∂
∂
 and ( ) ( )σγλδσγ /],,|[ ii
ik
ii ZRD
CR
ZISE Φ+=∂
∂
. 
We therefore plot the marginal effect corresponding to a one unit (i.e. one percentage point) 
change in internal R&D expenditures against external R&D expenditures (and vice versa). A 
positive association between the marginal effect of internal R&D expenditures and external 
R&D expenditures indicates that the efficacy of internal R&D expenditures increases in 
external R&D expenditures. In other words: the more firms spend on external R&D the more 
effective is internal R&D.  
Moreover, our specification includes the share of expenditures for other external knowledge, 
i.e. for the acquisition of intellectual property or licensing, over total innovation expenditure. 
The reference category, which is excluded from the specification due to perfect collinearity is 
the share of expenditure for innovation-related investments, i.e. machinery, equipment or 
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software, plus other innovation expenditure (marketing, testing, etc.) over total innovation 
expenditure. The alternative types of innovation expenditures hence constitute a characteristic 
pattern for the firms in our analysis. 
Control variables 
We control for a number of other factors that might be relevant in the two models. The first 
model for the choice of governance mode includes measures to control for the absorptive 
capacity of the firm. As absorptive capacities are developed by performing R&D activities we 
capture their effect in line with the literature (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Rothwell and 
Dodgson, 1991) through variables on the two major inputs for innovation activities: R&D 
expenditure (as a share of sales) and the expertise of employees (share of employees with 
college education relative to the industry average). Moreover, we add an additional dummy 
variable that indicates whether or not R&D activities are performed on a continuous basis and 
whether or not the firm had reported also process innovations since the structure of innovation 
expenditure may be different when product innovation is combined with process innovation. 
Finally, we control for regional differences between East and West Germany, company size 
(number of employees in logs and in squared terms to allow for non-linearities), whether or 
not the company is part of a group as well as industry effects (see Table 5 in the appendix for 
details). Our second model for the relationship between governance modes and innovation 
success includes the variables for regional differences, company size and industry affiliation. 
5 Results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Our results section starts with descriptive statistics of our dependent variables and our proxy 
variables displayed in Table 1. We show descriptive statistics for all firms and we additionally 
distinguish between R&D outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms. This differentiation allows 
us to come to a first univariate assessment of our hypotheses. We use multivariate estimation 
techniques, probit estimation and tobit estimation, to test whether or not our hypotheses hold 
in a multivariate setting that account for a wide range of proxy variables and control variables 
for observed heterogeneity in subsection 5.2. As it shall turn out in that subsection, a few 
univariate findings are overturned in the multivariate setting.  
Table 1 shows that 37 percent of the firms (512 firms in total) in our data outsource R&D 
tasks. The mean of our other explanatory variable, the share of new product sales, is 8.1 
percent. This share differs between outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms: it is 9.2 percent 
for outsourcing firms and 6.2 percent for non-outsourcing firms. This is consistent with 
Hypothesis 5b: external R&D activities increase innovation performance. 
The table also reveals substantial differences between outsourcing and non-outsourcing 
firms for almost all our proxy variables we use in hypotheses testing. These differences are 
also statistically significant unless indicated otherwise. The means of our two “uncertainty” 
proxy variables are for example much larger for outsourcing firms compared to non-
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outsourcing firms. As many as twelve percent of the outsourcing firms have cancelled an 
innovation project within the past three years while this is true for only seven percent of the 
non-outsourcing firms. If Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data, which states that higher 
uncertainty goes along with a lower propensity to outsource, then outsourcing firms should 
have more cancelled innovation projects – which they do as suggested by Table 1 – and a 
lower mean of the technology environment variable – which they do not. The univariate 
statistics hence come to mixed conclusions for Hypothesis 1.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  All firms Outsourcing 
firms 
Non- 
outsourcing 
firms 
Variable Obs. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D. 
Probit model for the outsourcing decision        
Dependent variable        
Engagement in contract research (dummy) 1,398 0.366 ---     
Uncertainty proxies        
Cancelled innovation projects (dummy) 1,398 0.111 --- 0.129 --- 0.067 --- 
Technology environment (factor score) 1,398 0.090 0.734 0.054 0.747 -0.025 0.770 
Asset specifity proxy        
No predecessor product (dummy) 1,398 0.576 --- 0.632 --- 0.498 --- 
Contractual experience proxies        
R&D collaboration (dummy)  1,398 0.338 --- 0.601 --- 0.192 --- 
Lagged engagement in contract research 
(dummy) 675 0.375 --- 0.670 --- 0.199 --- 
Openness to external knowledge proxies        
Lack of qualified personnel (ordinal) 1,398 1.081 0.903 1.169 0.890 0.996 0.915 
Lack of technological information (ordinal) 1,398 0.774 0.729 0.812 0.712 0.734 0.747 
Breadth of information sources (index score) 1,398 6.751 2.022 7.306 1.853 5.970 2.348 
Depth of information sources (index score) 1,398 1.230 1.194 1.384 1.268 0.981 1.087 
Control variables        
Process innovation (dummy) 1,400 0.562 --- 0.645 --- 0.516 --- 
Part of group (dummy) 1,400 0.636 --- 0.731 --- 0.584 --- 
Share of college graduates relative to sector-
level 1,398 1.704 5.882 1.159 2.820 1.949 7.136 
Continuous R&D activities (dummy) 1,398 0.526 --- 0.743 --- 0.287 --- 
R&D intensity 1,398 0.120 1.780 0.233 2.382 0.116 2.542 
Eastern Germany (dummy) 1,398 0.300 --- 0.306 --- 0.316 --- 
# employees (in logs) 1,398 4.391 1.754 4.927 1.891 3.958 1.619 
Tobit model for innovation success        
Dependent variable        
Share of sales with market novelties 1,437 0.081 0.168 9.234 17.080 6.156 14.884 
Explanatory variables        
Share of internal R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 1,437 0.434 0.354 0.494 0.303 0.310 0.367 
Share of external R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 1,437 0.042 0.089 0.153 0.171 0.000 0.000 
Share of expenditure for other external 
knowledge over total innovation expenditure 1,437 0.031 0.093 0.027 0.068 0.034 0.111 
Interaction internal and external R&D 1,437 0.019 0.039 0.060 0.063 0.000 0.000 
 
Most firms have introduced a new product that had no predecessor product in the firm, our 
measure for asset specifity. More outsourcing than non-outsourcing firms do, however, lack 
such a predecessor product. This contradicts Hypothesis 2 which predicts that asset specifity 
increases transaction cost and thereby reduces the propensity to outsource.  
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The share of firms that performed collaborative R&D and/or that outsourced R&D before is 
substantially larger for R&D outsourcing firms than for non-outsourcing firms. These 
variables are measures of contractual experience which, according to Hypothesis 3, increases 
the propensity to outsource. Our descriptive finding hence is consistent with this hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4, which predicts that openness to external knowledge sources increases the 
probability to outsource, is also supported by our univariate statistics: all four proxy variables 
have higher means for outsourcing than for non-outsourcing firms: they are more likely to 
lack qualified personnel, lack technological information and make both a broader and deeper 
use of information sources. These differences are, however, not always statistically 
significant. 
Outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms also differ in terms of our control variables for 
observed firm heterogeneity. Outsourcing firms are more likely to also have process 
innovations, to be part of a group, to perform continuous R&D, and they have more 
employees. By contrast, non-outsourcing firms employ a larger share of college graduates. 
There is no difference between outsourcing and non-outsourcing firms with respect to 
regional affiliation. 
5.2 Multivariate analyses 
Table 2 displays probit estimation results for the probability of engaging in contract 
research. We specify two models: Model 1 measures contractual experience by previous R&D 
collaboration while Model 2 uses variables for both R&D collaboration and past contract 
research (“State dependence dummy”). Our focus in the interpretation of results is on Model 1 
since the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable in Model 2 leads to a substantial 
reduction in the number of observations and therefore also in statistical significance. The 
results from Model 1 and Model 2 are both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar. Our 
results table contains both the parameter estimates (“Coeff.”) and marginal effects (“M. Eff.”) 
in order to increase the readability of our estimation results. 
Hypothesis 1, which states that uncertainty increases transaction cost and thereby reduces 
the propensity to engage in contract research, is fully supported by our estimation. Cancelled 
innovation projects increase the probability of engaging in contract research by eight 
percentage points. Model 1, however, does not show a significant coefficient for our measure 
of the technology environment. Instead, Model 2 exhibits a negative and significant effect as 
suggested by our hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2, referring to asset specifity which goes along with a reduced propensity of 
engaging in contract research, cannot be supported by our data. Lacking a predecessor leads 
to an increase in the probability to engage in contract research by five percentage points, an 
effect that is statistically weakly significant. One explanation for the contradiction may be that 
firms that launch a truly new product are more likely to turn to firms outside the own 
organization than firms that have experience with a similar product. Our finding of a positive 
impact then indicates that the latter effect outweighs the asset specifity effect.  
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Contractual experience indeed increases the propensity to engage in contract research as 
suggested by Hypothesis 3. R&D collaboration increases the propensity by 26 percentage 
points as indicated by Model 1, an effect that is measured with high precision. This effect 
reduces to 18 percentage points in Model 2 where we additionally include lagged contract 
research. The lagged variable is statistically highly significant and economically large: firms 
with past engagement in external R&D have a 31 percentage point higher probability of 
outsourcing than firms without such past engagement. This hence indicates substantial state 
dependence in the decision to engaging in contract research. 
That openness to external knowledge increases the probability to engaging in contract 
research, as stated by Hypothesis 4, is also fully supported by our estimates. All our proxy 
variables have a positive effect on the propensity to engage in contract research. These effects 
are, however, not statistically significant for the lack of technological information. For the 
lack of qualified personnel the effect is 3.9 percentage points, for the breadth of information 
sources the effect is 2.6 percentage points and for the depth of information sources the effect 
is 2.2 percentage points. 
The results for our control variables can be summarized as follows: (i) continuous R&D 
increases the probability of engaging in contract research by 24.2 percentage points 
suggesting that absorptive capacity matters very much in the decision to outsource R&D and 
(ii) larger firms are more likely to engage in external R&D. The other control variables do not 
have statistically significant effects although in Model 2 there is additionally a small and only 
weakly significant negative effect of the share of college graduates. 
21 
Table 2: Probit estimation for the probability of engaging in contract research 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. 
Uncertainty measures     
Cancelled innovation projects 0.211* 
(0.120) 
0.078* 
(0.046) 
0.117 
(0.181) 
0.043 
(0.068) 
Technology environment -0.084 
(0.059) 
-0.030 
(0.021) 
-0.176** 
(0.075) 
-0.064** 
(0.028) 
Asset specifity measure     
No predecessor product 0.149* 
(0.083) 
0.053* 
(0.030) 
0.090 
(0.117) 
0.033 
(0.043) 
Contractual experience measures     
State dependence    0.841*** 
(0.132) 
0.310*** 
(0.047) 
R&D collaboration  0.699*** 
(0.092) 
0.257*** 
(0.035) 
0.484*** 
(0.141) 
0.179*** 
(0.052) 
Openness to external knowledge measures     
Lack of qualified personnel 0.109** 
(0.047) 
0.039** 
(0.017) 
0.092 
(0.079) 
0.034 
(0.029) 
Lack of technological information 0.074 
(0.068) 
0.027 
(0.025) 
0.152 
(0.105) 
0.056 
(0.039) 
Breadth of information sources 0.072*** 
(0.026) 
0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.079* 
(0.041) 
0.029* 
(0.015) 
Depth of information sources 0.063* 
(0.036) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.073 
(0.054) 
0.027 
(0.020) 
Controls     
Process innovation  0.121 
(0.089) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
-0.090 
(0.133) 
-0.033 
(0.049) 
Part of group  0.063 
(0.088) 
0.023 
(0.031) 
0.097 
(0.141) 
0.029 
(0.051) 
R&D intensity -0.006 
(0.415) 
-0.002 
(0.149) 
0.969 
(0.609) 
0.354 
(0.224) 
Share of college graduates relative to sector-
level 
-0.012 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.051* 
(0.027) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
Continuous R&D activities  0.689*** 
(0.112) 
0.242*** 
(0.037) 
0.587*** 
(0.149) 
0.208*** 
(0.050) 
Eastern Germany  0.020 
(0.088) 
0.007 
(0.032) 
-0.088 
(0.145) 
-0.032 
(0.052) 
Employees (in logs) 0.391*** 
(0.104) 
0.140*** 
(0.037) 
0.323* 
(0.179) 
0.118* 
(0.066) 
Employees (in logs)2 -0.029*** 
(0.009) 
--- -0.027* 
(0.015) 
--- 
Constant -3.234*** 
(0.347) 
--- -3.081*** 
(0.577) 
--- 
6 industry dummies LR-Chi2 =  
24.53*** 
LR-Chi2 =  
4.76 
Observations 1,398 675 
Wald chi2 (21; 22) 586.26 157.66 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log (pseudo)likelihood -681.476 -306.336 
Pseudo R2 0.258 0.321 
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Table 2 shows probit estimation results for the probability of external R&D sourcing. Both coefficient estimates 
(“Coeff.”) and marginal effects (“M. Eff.”) are displayed in the table since the coefficient estimates are 
economically not meaningful. The marginal effects are changes in the decision to source R&D externally caused 
by a one percent change in the explanatory variables. The marginal effect for the number of employees is 
evaluated at the means of the involved variables. Reading example: firms with previously cancelled innovation 
projects have a eight percentage point higher probability of technology sourcing than firms without previously 
failing innovation projects. This effect is statistically weakly significant. 
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Table 3 displays our estimation results of the tobit model for innovation success. Our 
measure for innovation success is the share of sales with market novelties over total sales. We 
specify two models, Model 1 that does not have the interaction between expenditures for 
internal and external R&D expenditures and Model 2 which does have that interaction. The 
estimation results are very similar to one another both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
Consistent with Hypothesis 5a, internal R&D activities in fact increase innovation success. 
An increase in the share of internal R&D expenditures relative to total innovation 
expenditures by one percentage point leads to an increase in the share of turnover with market 
novelties over total turnover by 0.20 percentage points.  
External R&D plays an even more important role than internal R&D: a one percent increase 
in the share of external R&D in total innovation expenditures is related to an increase in 
innovation success by 0.38 percentage points which is in accordance to Hypothesis 5b. The 
marginal effect of contract research even exceeds the one of internal R&D. 
The estimation results shown in Table 3 also support Hypothesis 5c since they indicate a 
complementary relationship between internal and external R&D. This is indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction between internal and 
external R&D. The extent to which an increase in internal R&D or an increase in external 
R&D matters for innovation success is not only firm-specific (as it is the case for any 
marginal effect) but it depends also on the value of the respective other variable: the effect of 
internal R&D depends upon how much the firm spends on external R&D (and vice versa).  
Apart from that, the estimation shows a negative effect of innovation expenditure for other 
external knowledge which for example comprises the acquisition of licenses. This knowledge 
seems to be difficult to integrate into the innovation process of the firm leading to lower 
overall innovation performance. Regarding the control variables it turns out that firms being 
located in Eastern Germany exhibit a lower performance. Finally, smaller firms in terms of 
the number of employees tend to have a higher innovation performance although there is a 
turning point at a firm size of 628 employees from where innovation performance tends to 
increase. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 present a graphical exposition of the mutual dependencies of internal 
and external R&D. Figure 2 plots the marginal effects of internal against the share of external 
R&D in total innovation expenditure while Figure 3 plots marginal effects against the share of 
internal R&D. Both figures show that there is a positive relationship between internal and 
external R&D: the payoff from internal R&D is the higher the more a firm spends on external 
R&D (and vice versa). Both figures strongly reinforce our finding of complementarity 
between internal and external R&D. 
Table 4 summarizes our theoretical hypotheses and empirical findings. It shows that all our 
hypotheses apart from the one related to asset specifity (Hypothesis 2) are supported by our 
estimation results. 
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Table 3: Tobit estimation results for the innovation success 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 
 Coeff. M. Eff. Coeff. M. Eff. 
Share of internal R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 
0.137*** 
(0.026) 
0.195*** 
(0.037) 
0.121*** 
(0.027) 
0.173*** 
(0.039) 
Share of external R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 
0.264*** 
(0.093) 
0.378*** 
(0.132) 
0.058 
(0.145) 
0.083 
(0.208) 
Share of expenditure for other external 
knowledge over total innovation expenditure 
-0.313*** 
(0.119) 
-0.447*** 
(0.170) 
-0.307*** 
(0.118) 
-0.439*** 
(0.169) 
Interaction internal and external R&D   0.625* 
(0.335) 
0.894* 
(0.480) 
Eastern Germany dummy -0.062*** 
(0.019) 
-0.087*** 
(0.026) 
-0.064*** 
(0.019) 
-0.090*** 
(0.026) 
Employees (in logs) -0.055*** 
(0.019) 
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.056*** 
(0.019) 
-0.081*** 
(0.027) 
Employees (in logs)2 0.004** 
(0.002) 
--- 0.004** 
(0.002) 
--- 
Constant 0.028 
(0.050) 
--- 0.038 
(0.051) 
--- 
6 industry dummies F (5, 1426) = 
4.43*** 
F (5, 1425) = 
4.19*** 
Observations 1,437 1,437 
LR chi2 (11; 13) 121.33 124.82 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 
Log (pseudo)likelihood -528.611 -526.868 
Pseudo R2 0.103 0.106 
Marginal effects for the probability of being uncensored; standard errors in parentheses;  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***significant at 1% 
Table 3 shows tobit estimation results for new product sales relative to total sales, our measure for innovation 
success. Both coefficient estimates (“Coeff.”) and marginal effects (“M. Eff.”) are displayed in the table since 
the coefficient estimates are economically not meaningful. Reading example: a one percent increase in the share 
of internal R&D expenditures relative to total innovation expenditures leads to an increase in innovation 
performance by 0.18 percentage points. This effect is statistically highly significant. 
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Figure 2:  Marginal effect of a one percent point change in the share of internal R&D 
on innovation success 
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Figure 2 plots the share of external R&D in total innovation expenditure against the marginal effect of 
own R&D expenditures.  
Figure 3:  Marginal effect of a one percent point change in the share of contract 
research on innovation success 
0
10
20
30
40
50
M
ar
gi
na
l e
ff
ec
t o
f c
on
tra
ct
 R
&
D
 (i
n 
%
) 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Share own R&D (in %)
 
Figure 3 plots the share of internal R&D in total innovation expenditure against the marginal effect of 
own R&D expenditures.  
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Table 4: Results summary 
Variable Expected sign Actual sign 
Probit model for the outsourcing decision   
Uncertainty proxies (Hypothesis 1)   
Cancelled innovation projects (dummy) + + 
Market/technology environment - - 
Asset specifity proxies (Hypothesis 2)   
Lack of predecessor product (dummy) - + 
Contractual experience proxies (Hypothesis 3)   
R&D collaboration (dummy)  + + 
Lagged engagement in contract research 
(dummy) 
+ + 
Openness to external knowledge proxies (Hypothesis 4)  
Lack of qualified personnel + + 
Lack of technological information + + (n.s.) 
Breadth of information sources + + 
Depth of information sources + + 
Tobit model for innovation success (Hypothesis 5) 
Share of internal R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 
+ + 
Share of external R&D over total innovation 
expenditure 
+ + 
Interaction internal and external R&D + + 
 
6 Discussion 
This research investigates a firm’s decision to engage in contract research as a rather 
neglected mechanism for the acquisition of technological knowledge. Contract research has 
been shown to be frequently used by firms that spent, however, substantially less on external 
R&D compared to internal R&D. Despite its frequent use, little is known about the factors 
that (i) influence a firm’s decision to allocate innovation expenditure to contract research 
organizations and (ii) the resulting implications for firm performance.  
We adopt a transaction and firm-level perspective to elucidate these questions. Transaction 
cost arguments have frequently been used in analyzing a firm’s boundary decisions. 
Additionally, firm-specific factors are taken into account to reflect the notion that a firm’s 
history, specific demands and capabilities may have a considerable impact on the choice for 
internal or external R&D. This is particularly relevant given the common belief that firms 
largely differ in their resource endowment and capabilities (e.g., Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 
1991) which should eventually influence R&D boundary decisions (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 
Leiblein and Miller, 2003).  
Our results show that both transaction and firm-level factors considerably matter in the 
decision to engage in contract research. First of all, following a number of related studies 
(e.g., Robbertson and Gatignon, 1998; Leiblein et al., 2002; Leiblein and Miller, 2003) we 
identify uncertainty and asset specifity as important drivers in a firm’s boundary decision. Our 
estimation results indeed support that increased uncertainty decreases the outsourcing 
decision as predicted by transaction cost theory. Our results do not, however, support that 
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asset specifity decreases the likelihood of external R&D although it should be mentioned that 
an empirical measure for asset specifity can never be precise. The explanatory power of the 
transaction cost arguments hence seems to be rather limited in that context.  
Second, it has been noted in literature that not only transaction-level effects will determine 
the decision to outsource R&D but that a critical role is also played by the specific history, 
capabilities and resource endowments of a firm (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). As firms will 
strive to choose the governance mode that complements capabilities in a way that knowledge 
gaps can be bridged, our study focuses on contractual experience and the openness to external 
innovation stimuli to account for such firm-level factors. Both of our RBV-based hypotheses 
are supported by the data. This underlines the high importance of firm-level factors in 
explaining the choice to engage in contract research as a way to get access to externally 
available resources. On the one hand, experience in interacting with external research 
organizations apparently increases the likelihood of repeating such kind of interaction. Prior 
experience presumably leads to the creation of organizational routines that facilitate 
subsequent collaboration and outsourcing. On the other hand, our results show that being open 
to various types of external knowledge sources also increases the decision for contract 
research. It is particularly the breadth of innovation sources that triggers contract research 
activities. Hence, the more diverse the spectrum of knowledge sources the more likely a firm 
will engage in contract research. This firm behavior reflects the open innovation model of 
“connect and develop” (Chesbrough, 2003). In this respect, openness is triggered by a 
perceived lack of qualified personnel and not by a lack of technological knowledge. It seems 
that it is predominantly an issue of available human resources and the embodied (tacit) 
knowledge that is accessed through contract research. To sum up, the R&D outsourcing 
decision is shown to be both driven by firm-level factors and transaction-level factors. 
The second step of the analysis focuses on the performance implication of engaging in 
contract research. While the resulting trade-offs between internalizing and outsourcing firm 
activities have been analyzed in various settings (e.g., Walker and Weber, 1984; Leiblein et 
al., 2002) little is known about how contract research translates into innovation success. Our 
results show positive and significant effects for both internal and external R&D expenditure. 
Moreover, our results strongly suggest that both governance modes are complementary to one 
another. This result confirms existing findings in the context of an interaction between 
internal R&D and R&D alliances (Rothaermel et al., 2006) which refers to a more hybrid 
governance mode in contrast to external R&D through contract research. There is hence 
strong support for the argument that internal and external R&D require a careful balancing of 
the organization of innovation to achieve superior innovation performance. Contract research 
obviously fills a gap in a firm’s sourcing strategy for technological knowledge in that it 
provides a comparably quick access to such knowledge without engaging into a collaborative 
agreement with a partner. This stresses the need for firms to find organizational arrangements 
for those tasks which encompass virtually no interaction with partners and hence do not cause 
organization costs. Moreover, contract research serves as an instrument for an “ad-hoc 
problem solving” (Winter, 2003), i.e. it provides a timely reaction on a closely contoured 
research project. 
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The characteristics of contract research to provide a means for closing knowledge gaps and 
to serve as an “ad-hoc problem solving” mechanism need to be reflected by management 
when organizing for innovation. Managers should hence not regard contract research 
primarily as a cost-saving way of buying research results at the market for research services. 
First and foremost, contract research serves as a cornerstone in pursuing an open innovation 
model. In this respect, contract research needs to be carefully balanced with other types of 
innovation sources regarding possible complementary and substitutive effects. As the 
descriptive statistics indicated, while a substantial share of firms engaged in contract research, 
the innovation budget allocated to these activities remains rather low. Our results suggest that 
making more intensively use of contract research actually increases innovation performance. 
But this needs to be reflected against the background of other R&D alliances set up by the 
firm. Contractual relationships still require management attention and its limits need to be 
taken into account when contract research activities are intended to be increased. 
7 Conclusion and further research 
The existing literature on external technology acquisition has primarily focused on 
phenomena like alliance formation or firm acquisitions as means to access external 
knowledge (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005; Cassiman et al., 2005). In contrast, 
comprehensive empirical evidence on the choice for contract research has been scarce even 
though such activities are to a large extent an inherent part of any firms’ innovation model. 
Moreover, while several authors refer to transaction cost theory to elucidate specific 
transaction-level characteristics that influence the choice for alternative forms of governance 
(Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Love and Roper, 2002; Gooroochurn and Hanley, 2007), the 
existing literature provides almost no indication for the role of firm-level differences in the 
choice for technology sourcing modes. Our paper sheds light on what factors actually lead to 
engage in contract research by drawing from transaction cost arguments and the resource-
based view of the firm.  
We use a large and comprehensive data set on 1,400 German firms from manufacturing and 
service industries to find that both the hypotheses derived from transaction cost theory and 
from the resource based view of the firm are at least partly supported by our data: 
technological uncertainty, contractual experience as well as openness to external knowledge 
increase the propensity to engage in contract research.  
Another innovation of our paper is that we relate the technology sourcing choice to 
innovation performance. We find that both internal and external R&D efforts contribute to 
innovation success. Interestingly our estimation results provide ample evidence for 
complementarities between internal and external R&D, an issue that has not received attention 
in the existing literature so far. In other words: spending more on internal R&D increases the 
contribution of external R&D to innovation success (and vice versa). 
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8 Appendix 
Table 5: Industry breakdown 
Industry NACE Code Industry Group 
Mining and quarrying 10 – 14 Other manufacturing 
Food and tobacco 15 – 16 Other manufacturing 
Textiles  and leather 17 – 19 Other manufacturing 
Wood / paper / publishing 20 – 22 Other manufacturing 
Chemicals / petroleum  23 – 24 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Plastics / rubber  25 Other manufacturing 
Glass / ceramics  26 Other manufacturing 
Metal  27 – 28 Other manufacturing 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment 29 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of electrical equipment and electronics 30 – 32 High-tech manufacturing 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 High-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of motor vehicles 34 – 35 Medium high-tech manufacturing 
Manufacture of furniture, jewellery, sports 
equipment and toys 
36 – 37 Other manufacturing 
Electricity, gas and water supply 40 – 41 Other manufacturing 
Construction 45 Other manufacturing 
Retail and motor trade 50, 52 Distributive services 
Wholesale trade 51 Distributive services 
Transportation and communication 60 – 63, 64.1 Distributive services 
Financial intermediation 65 – 67 Knowledge-intensive services 
Real estate activities and renting 70 – 71 Distributive services 
ICT services 72, 64.3 Technological services 
Technical services 73, 74.2, 74.3 Technological services 
Consulting/Advertising 74.1, 74.4 Knowledge-intensive services 
Motion picture/broadcasting 92.1 – 92.2 Knowledge-intensive services 
Other business-oriented services 74.5 – 74.8, 90 Distributive services 
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